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Does Size Matter? The Impact of Changes in Household 
Structure on Income Distribution in Germany
* 
 
In Germany, two observations can be made over the past 20 years: First, income inequality 
has been constantly increasing while, second, the average household size has been 
declining dramatically. The analysis of income distribution relies on equivalence-weighted 
incomes which take into account household size. Therefore, there is an obvious link between 
these two developments. The aim of the paper is to quantify how the trend towards smaller 
households has influenced the change in income distribution. In order to do so, we are using 
a decomposition of changes in inequality measures over time allowing for a separation 
between wage and demographic effects respectively. We propose similar decompositions for 
the change in poverty and richness as well and compare them with results that were obtained 
by a re-weighting procedure. Our results show that the income gap would also have 
increased without the demographic trend. But its level would be lower than it actually is. In 
addition, the demographic effect turns out to be larger for incomes before tax and benefits. 
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Since reuniﬁcation in 1990, inequality as well as poverty and richness of the equiva-
lent disposable income distribution in Germany have increased considerably (OECD,
2008; Peichl, Schaefer, and Scheicher, 2008; Bach, Corneo, and Steiner, 2009). The
German government is concerned with this development and is designing policies to
counteract it (Bundesregierung, 2008). However, from a policy perspective it is im-
portant to understand the driving forces behind this development. If, for instance,
the rise in inequality is caused by widening of the distribution of market incomes
due to a weakening of bargaining power of unions, the appropriate answer might
diﬀer from the one in a situation where rising inequality is predominantly caused by
a structural change in household formation. The latter is linked to rising inequality,
since a declining average number of individuals living together in a household is
aﬀecting the income distribution as well. This is due to the fact that the analysis of
income distributions is normally based on equivalence-weighted income as a proxy
for individual well-being. Equivalence scales account for number and age of house-
hold members. Therefore, everything else equal, the income distribution changes if
the household structure changes.1
The aim of this paper is to quantify the eﬀect of demographic change on income
distribution in Germany. The case of Germany is of special interest for the analysis
of the impact of changing household structure as the demographic development
is not only characterized by incremental aging, but also by a sharp fall in average
household size, which is now – together with Sweden – lowest among OECD countries
(OECD, 2008, p. 59). Especially the proportion of one- and two-person households
has increased dramatically.2 The increase in the number of one-person households
1 For instance, according to the Federal Statistical Oﬃce, average real income per household
has decreased by about two per cent since 1991, while equivalence-weighted average income has
increased by two per cent (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008b, p. 147).
2 The average number of individuals living together in a household has decreased from 2.27 to
2.11 between 1991 and 2005 (by about 7 per cent) according to the German Micro Census 2005.
In East Germany this decrease was even twice as large: While average household size was 2.31
in 1991, there were only less than two individuals (1.98) sharing a household on average in 2005.
This corresponds to a decrease by 14.3 per cent. While population size increased by 3.1 per cent
between 1991 and 2005 (from 80.2 to 82.7 million), the number of private households increased
by 11.1 per cent to 39.2 million. This was solely caused by the rising number of households with
two members at most. The number of one- and two-person households increased by 23.9 and
1can be primarily explained by a higher risk of divorce and a lower frequency of
marriages. The increase in two-person households is related to two developments:
First, the number of childless couples has grown and, second, the increase in life
expectancy has led to a growing number of elderly two-person households.
Against the background of its very pronounced development towards smaller
households it is striking that there has not been much research that systematically
analyzes the eﬀect of demographic trends on income distribution for Germany. The
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development reports in its recent
study on inequality (OECD, 2008) that a share of 88 per cent of total (absolute)
change in the Gini coeﬃcient of disposable incomes in West Germany from 1985 to
2005 is due to changing population structure with respect to household character-
istics.3 This share is by far the highest among OECD countries and implies that
the total increase in inequality is nearly completely related to changing household
formation patterns. Moreover, it raised a public policy debate in Germany over
the underlying causes of the growing income gap in Germany after the government
had published its Third Report on Poverty and Richness (Bundesregierung, 2008)
which came to very diﬀerent conclusions than the OECD report.4 However, in the
course of our analysis we were not nearly able to replicate the OECD’s result. In the
meantime, the authors of the OECD study upon request conﬁrmed that the result
of 88 per cent we refer to is not correct and a misprint.5 Therefore, it is necessary
22.1 per cent respectively while the number of households with at least three members has been
decreasing (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005). For a large part, this development can be explained
by the drastic and continuous decline of Germany’s birth rate. In 1991, the number of live births
was 830.019, while there were only 685.795 in 2005. This corresponds to a decrease by 17.4 per
cent. The number of births reached its maximum of 1.357.304 in 1964 (Statistisches Bundesamt,
2008a). In addition, one can assume that the trend towards individualization also accounted for a
large part of this observation.
3 I.e. the number of household members and the age of the household head (OECD, 2008, p. 66).
4 See e.g. Sinn (2008). There is also evidence for disagreement within the Federal Government
concerning the appropriateness of measures to be followed in answer to the growing income gap:
While the Ministry of Labor and Social Aﬀairs (BMAS), which is responsible for the Report,
proposed minimum wages and higher government transfers, the Ministry of Economics and Tech-
nology (BMWi) among other things questions the necessity of such measures and emphasizes the
development of the population structure as the main contributor to increasing income inequality,
referring to OECD (2008).
5 However, so far they were not able to produce a corrected number for Germany. In our analysis,
we ﬁnd a value of 64% for pre ﬁsc incomes and 14% for disposable incomes when restricting our
sample to West Germany 1985–2005 and applying the same selection criteria and equivalence scales
as in the OECD report.
2to re-assess the eﬀect of changing household structures on inequality in Germany.
A priori, it remains unclear in which direction demographic change aﬀects
measures of income distribution because of two opposing eﬀects. On the one hand,
the noticeable decline of the number of births, for example, means that couples
nowadays tend to stay childless. This leaves them with higher equivalence-weighted
incomes than in a situation with a higher birth rate, i.e. more children, and alleviates
double-earnership. On the other hand, the increase in the number of single house-
holds results in a growing number of individuals with lower equivalence-weighted
incomes, since they cannot share ﬁxed costs of living expenses. Therefore, the
shrinking average household size has contradictory eﬀects on income distribution.
The net-eﬀect depends on whether the relevant population subgroups have incomes
rather above or below average.6
In order to assess the impact of the changing household structure between
1991 and 2007, in principle, it is possible to use two diﬀerent methods. The ﬁrst
one comes from labor economics and follows the tradition of the Oaxaca-Blinder de-
composition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973). A re-weighting procedure is applied in
order to obtain new counterfactual income distributions while keeping the marginal
distributions of other characteristics ﬁxed (Di Nardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996).
These procedures have already been applied to other contexts that are related to
wage and wealth inequality respectively (Lemieux, 2006; Bover, 2008) and it is also
the approach that has been chosen in the OECD report. In order to check the
sensitivity of the results with respect to the underlying method, we compare the
results from the re-weighting approach with an exact decomposition of the distri-
butional change by population subgroups, which is more common in the literature
on inequality (Shorrocks, 1980; Mookherjee and Shorrocks, 1982; Shorrocks, 1984).
It follows similar studies analyzing the eﬀect of demographic change on inequality
for the United Kingdom (Jenkins, 1995) and the United States (Martin, 2006). For
Germany, this decomposition technique has been applied to regional diﬀerences in
income inequality after reuniﬁcation (Schwarze, 1996). Similar approaches that do
not depend on a speciﬁc choice of summary index were described by Jenkins and
6 Decreasing (increasing) population shares lead to a reduction of (an increase in) inequality, if
the related average income is above average and vice versa.
3Van Kerm (2005). Other approaches aim at decomposing the eﬀects of tax-beneﬁt
reforms on income distribution (Bargain and Callan, 2008).
In addition to quantifying the impact of changing household structure on in-
equality, our paper contributes to the existing literature by deriving similar de-
composition techniques for changes in poverty and richness measures. Using these
additional decomposition methods enables us to conduct a more detailed analysis of
the tails of the income distribution. Based on data of the German Socio-Economic
Panel Study (GSOEP), we analyze the eﬀect of the demographic change of the
German population on income inequality, poverty, and richness.
The results show to what extent the demographic trend has aﬀected the devel-
opment of over-all inequality, poverty, and richness. We ﬁnd that the growth of the
income gap in Germany (East and West, 1991–2007) is partly related to changing
household structure. For inequality of incomes before taxes and transfers we ﬁnd
a fraction of 43 per cent. The result for incomes after taxes and transfers is 15
per cent which is dramatically lower than the numbers reported by OECD (2008).
Without the demographic trend towards smaller households the income gap would
also have increased. However, its level would be lower than it actually is. The same
holds for the change in poverty and richness measures. These results are in line with
the counterfactual re-weighting procedure, which in addition reveals that ﬁscal costs
would be quite considerable if the federal government aimed at reducing inequality
to the level that would have been achieved without changes in household structure.
The paper is further organized as follows: Section 2 gives a review of relevant
deﬁnitions and methods. In Section 3 these methods are applied to German survey
data. The results are presented in Section 4. The paper is concluding in Section 5.
2 Methodology: Re-weighting and Decomposition
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the rationale for the equivalence weighting of in-
comes and then describe methods for re-weighting and for the measurement and
decomposition of inequality, poverty, and richness.
42.1 Equivalence Weighting of Incomes
In general, economic well-being is considered as an ”individual experience”. So, at
ﬁrst sight, for the analysis of income distribution it would be suﬃcient to look at
actually and individually received incomes. However, this would leave dependent
persons without incomes on their own (like spouses or children). Moreover, one
would consider individuals as poor even if they happen to live in an aﬄuent house-
hold. One would systematically ignore that income recipients usually share their
resources with their fellow household members, which is considered as a form of
private transfers (Canberra Group, 2001, p. 32).
Looking at pure household per-capita incomes, however, would leave economies
of scale in household consumption unconsidered. These result from decreasing aver-
age ﬁxed costs when household size increases. That is why the individual welfare of
persons with the same amount of income depends on whether they live alone or to-
gether with others. Cohabitation reduces the individual share of ﬁxed costs of living
expenses and hence contributes to a higher level of material comfort of individuals.
Therefore, empirical measurement of income is subject to an equivalence weight-
ing procedure. In this way, individual incomes can be compared to each other in-
dependent of household size. For example, if one computes equivalence-weighted
incomes for members of a multi-person household, the resulting sum informs about
how much monetary income a single person needs in order to derive the same – i.e.
the equivalent – level of utility. So, what one actually measures is the distribution
of ”living standards among artiﬁcial quasi-homogeneous individuals” (B¨ onke and
Schr¨ oder, 2008, p. 2). In empirical research, equivalence-weighted incomes result
from dividing the sum of total household income by a value in proportion to its
needs which depends on number of household members and further household char-
acteristics (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000, p. 93 f.). These values are assigned
with the help of equivalence scales.
An illustrative example: Consider a situation with four individuals with an
income of 10 monetary units each. Two of them live in single-households and the
two others share a household (without children). The level of living standard of the
two singles is simply determined by their incomes since it is divided by the accord-
5ing equivalence weight which is just one in these cases.7 The living standard of the
couple household members is however determined by division of the sum of their
incomes (20) by the sum of their equivalence weights (1.5 according to the OECD
scale), because of the economies of scale in household consumption. Hence, their
equivalent income is 13.33 each. This distribution of equivalent incomes (10, 10,
13.33, 13.33) is characterized by some inequality: the Gini coeﬃcient is about 0.07.
If the two single adults would decide to cohabitate in order to pool their income
resources, we arrive at a second two-adult household with total household income
of 20. Of course equivalence weights must be adjusted accordingly and we have
a distribution of equivalent incomes with for individuals with the same income of
13.33 each, i.e. perfect equality. Hence, the change in household structure – from
two single-households and one two-adult household to two two-adult households –
leads to a higher average standard of living and a reduction of inequality. Note that
values of the monetary incomes remained unchanged throughout this illustration.
This means, there is a relationship between household structure and individual wel-
fare. We analyze the reverse movement of more and more multi-person households
splitting into several smaller households.
2.2 Re-weighting Procedure
In order to assess the impact of the changing household structure between 1991 and
2007, we need to compare the counterfactual distribution of 2007 incomes and 1991
household structure with the observed 2007 income distribution. In order to do
so, we follow the approach suggested by Di Nardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) to
estimate the counterfactual density function using a re-weighting technique.
Each individual household can be described by a vector (y,x,t) consisting of an
income y, a vector x of household characteristics, and a date t (1991 or 2007). Each
observation belongs to a joint distribution function F(y,x,t) of income, characteris-
tics and date. The joint distribution of income and characteristics is the conditional
7 In empirical research, diﬀerent equivalence scales are used. All of them assign a weight of
1.0 to a single adult, e.g. the modiﬁed OECD scale. It assigns a weight of 1.0 to the ﬁrst (adult)
household member. Every additional adult is assigned a weight of 0.5 and every child a weight of
0.3 (OECD, 2005).
6distribution F(y,x|t). The density of income at one point in time, ft(y), can be
written as the integral of the density of income conditional on a set of characteris-




dF(y,x|ty,x = t) =
Z
f(y|x,ty = t)dF(x|tx = t) (1a)
≡ f(y,ty = t,tx = t). (1b)
Since the estimation of counterfactual densities combines diﬀerent dates, the no-
tation in the last line accounts for these. Under the assumption, that the 2007
distribution of incomes, F(y|x,ty = 2007), does not depend on the 1991 distribution
of characteristics, F(x|tx = 1991), the hypothetical counterfactual density is:
f(y,ty = 2007,tx = 1991) =
Z
f(y|x,ty = 2007)dF(x|tx = 1991) (2a)
=
Z
f(y|x,ty = 2007)ψx(x)dF(x|tx = 2007), (2b)





The counterfactual density can be estimated by weighted kernel methods. The
diﬀerence between the actual 2007 density and the hypothetical re-weighted density
represents the eﬀect of changes in the distribution of household’s characteristics.
To estimate the impact of the changing household structure between 1991 and
2007, we compare measures of distribution M(·) for the counterfactual distribu-
tion of 2007 incomes and 1991 household structure with the observed 2007 income
distribution:
δ = M(f(y,ty = 2007,tx = 2007)) − M(f(y,ty = 2007,tx = 1991)) (4)
We apply this method and compare the re-weighting with an exact decomposition
technique, which is described in the next subsection.
72.3 Decomposition Techniques
2.3.1 Inequality
In the literature, there are several measures of inequality (see e.g. Atkinson and
Bourguignon (2000)). In the context of our approach, for analyzing the eﬀect of
household structures on income inequality, the class of Generalized Entropy (GE)
inequality measures (Shorrocks, 1980) is the most suitable one. The GE measures
can be decomposed in a way such that total inequality results as the sum of inequality
within and between population subgroups. The class of GE measures is deﬁned for
an income distribution Y = (y1,...,yn), where yi denotes income of individual




i=1) · yi denotes the arithmetic mean of individual incomes. The GE
measures are deﬁned as
Ic =

     

































for c = 1.
(5)
The coeﬃcient c can be interpreted as a parameter of inequality aversion. The larger
(smaller) c the more sensitive is the GE measure for changes in the higher (lower)
tail of the income distribution (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000, p. 110). For the
purpose of this paper we choose I0 from the GE inequality measures, which is also
known as mean logarithmic deviation (Mookherjee and Shorrocks, 1982, p. 889).9
If one divides total population into K disjoint and exhaustive subgroups that
8 If a weight of one is assigned to every individual, i.e. wi = 1 ∀ i, it holds
Pn
i=1 wi = n and
wi/
Pn
i=1 wi = 1/n respectively.
9 According to Shorrocks the features of this measure are best suitable for decomposition anal-
ysis, since total inequality can be exactly decomposed into within- and between-group inequality.
Moreover, the weighting factors sum up to unity (Shorrocks, 1980, p. 625).






































i∈k wi denotes the weighted number and vk the weighted proportion of indi-
viduals belonging to population subgroup k. The mean income of subgroup k is de-




i∈k wi)·ln(¯ yk/yi). Hence,
total inequality can be written as a weighted sum of inequality within (W) and be-
tween (B) population subgroups. Population ratios vk thereby serve as weighting
factors. Inequality decomposition within and between population subgroups pro-
vides a basis for decomposing the change in total inequality between period t and
t + 1 into changes within population subgroups and changes that result from shift-




































where ∆ is the diﬀerence-operator. In addition, λk = ¯ yk/¯ y denotes the ratio of
population subgroup k’s mean income to total population’s mean income and θk =
vk · λk the income ratio of group k. A symbol with a bar denotes the particular
value averaged over periods t and t+1.10 Thus, the change in total inequality from
one point in time to the next can be decomposed into four components denoted by
A, B, C and D. Again, one can distinguish between inequality changes within and
10 Alternatively, it would be possible to use base or ﬁnal period weights. However, Mookherjee
and Shorrocks (1982) point out that this choice is unlikely to make a diﬀerence to the results
(p. 896). In addition, this corresponds to the weight that would be assigned by the Shapley value
algorithm (Shorrocks, 1999; Jenkins and Van Kerm, 2005).
9between population subgroups (Mookherjee and Shorrocks, 1982, p. 897):
Summand A summarizes the eﬀect of inequality changes within population
subgroups (∆I0k). In particular, it contains the contribution of inequality changes
that solely result from changes within population subgroups. It abstracts from
changes in population composition by ﬁxing population ratios on averaged values
(¯ vk).11 Accordingly, changes in inequality within groups with higher proportions in
population would therefore be of more importance than changes within relatively
small groups.
Summand B on the other hand contains the eﬀect of changes in population
composition (∆vk) on inequality within population subgroups. It analogously ab-
stracts from changes in within-group inequality by ﬁxing it on averaged values (¯ I0k),
since changes in population ratios are crucial for summand B. If, for example, the
proportions of groups with relative high levels of inequality increase, total inequality
will increase accordingly and vice versa.
Summand C describes the eﬀect of changes in population composition (∆vk),
though, contrary to summand B, on inequality between population subgroups. Again,
changes in population ratios are crucial for the direction of change. It ﬁxes the ra-
tio of group mean incomes to total mean income (λk), which becomes apparent in
the term in squared brackets, although it has no intuitive interpretation for it. So,
summand C sums up the contribution to total inequality change that results when
proportions of groups with relative high or low mean incomes (compared to total
mean income) increase or decrease.
Summand D ﬁnally represents the contribution of changes in population
subgroup mean incomes (∆ln(¯ yk)). It ﬁxes the diﬀerence between group proportions
of total income and population respectively. The change in the logs of population
subgroup mean income is of importance here. The higher the income ratio of a
group relative to its population ratio the larger the eﬀect on total income inequality
when the mean income of that group changes.
In summary: summand A represents changes in pure inequality within popu-
11 Especially for smaller time intervals (e.g. two consecutive years), summand A can be inter-
preted as a change in ”pure” inequality, since the distribution of population subgroups in general
does not change ad hoc (Jenkins, 1995, p. 38).
10lation subgroups. Since all individuals belonging to a particular group are identical
with respect to certain characteristics, summand A displays changes in inequality
that result from other characteristics (e.g. diﬀerences in education levels aﬀecting
wage and hence income inequality). Summands B and C together represent the
contribution to inequality change resulting from demographic change, since they are
based on shifting population ratios. Summand D represents the eﬀect of changes in
the distribution of population subgroup mean incomes. With respect to the purpose
of this paper, the relative importance of summands B and C compared to total
change in inequality ∆I0 is of prior interest.
2.3.2 Poverty
A well-known and widely used measure of poverty, which is decomposable by popula-
tion subgroups, was introduced by Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984). In addition
to only counting the number of poor within a population (which results in the so-
called head-count poverty index) it is based on the concept of relative deprivation,
which depends on the relative distance between a poor person’s income and the
poverty line. However, the FGT poverty measure comprises the head-count index
as a special case (see below). Like the GE inequality measures it is deﬁned for an










for yi ≤ z, (8)
where α ≥ 0 is a parameter of poverty aversion12 and gi = z−yi denotes the income
shortfall between individual i’s income yi and a poverty line z. The number of poor
is denoted by q. They receive an income not exceeding the poverty line z (Foster,
Greer, and Thorbecke, 1984, p. 761 f.). Population weights are again denoted with
wi (see above).
Among other things, the derivation of this measure was also motivated by its
properties of decomposability for population subgroups while, at the same time, not
violating the basic properties for poverty measures proposed by Sen (1976, 1979).
12 For a larger α there is more emphasis on the ”poorest poor” (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke,
1984, p. 763). For α = 0 the measure reveals the head-count index.
11If one divides the population into K disjoint and exhaustive population subgroups,




vk · Pα,k(yk;z), (9)
where vk denotes the population share. Subgroup k’s income vector is denoted by yk








for yi∈k ≤ z, where qk denotes the number of poor units within group k. Hence,
total poverty can be expressed as a weighted sum of poverty in population subgroups
with population share weights (Bourguignon and Ferreira, 2005, p. 26).
In order to assess how much of an observed change in total poverty can be
attributed to demographic changes, it is necessary to decompose the change into


















where ∆ again denotes the diﬀerence-operator. This decomposition of change also
corresponds to the one that results from a Shapley value decomposition (Shorrocks,
1999). So, the change in total poverty (∆Pα) can be decomposed into the change
in levels of group poverty (labeled A) and changes in the composition of population
(demographic change, labeled B).
2.3.3 Richness
Income richness is a less considered ﬁeld than income poverty. However, there
are measures that do not only account for the head count of rich, but are also
decomposable by population subgroups, and allow for a consideration of the intensity
and severity of aﬄuence analogous to the FGT poverty measure. For a description of
desirable properties and axioms that a measure of richness should satisfy see Peichl,













for yi ≥ ρ. (11)
Here, β > 0 is a parameter for the sensitivity to intensive richness. For greater values
of β the richness measure puts more weight on the ”very rich”. The richness line is
denoted by ρ. Individuals with an income above this line are deﬁned as the rich in
the society. As before individual incomes and population weights are denoted by yi
and wi respectively. As in the cases of inequality and poverty it is possible to express




vk · Rβ,k(yk;ρ), (12)









for yi∈k ≥ ρ and sk denotes the number of rich within each group.
Analogous to the decomposition of poverty change over time it is straightforward to


















The interpretation of this decomposition is the same as for poverty: summand B is
the fraction of the over-all change in richness that is related to demographic change
(see above).
3 Empirical Foundation
3.1 Data: The German Socio-Economic Panel Study
The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) is a panel survey of households
and individuals in the Federal Republic of Germany that has been conducted an-
nually since 1984. The study is maintained by the German Institute for Economic
13Research (DIW) in Berlin. A weighting procedure allows to make respondents’ data
to be representative for the German population as a whole. A detailed overview
of the GSOEP is provided by its Desktop-Companion (Haisken-DeNew and Frick,
2005) or by Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007). Issues concerning sampling and
weighting methods or the imputation of information in case of item or unit non-
response is well documented by the GSOEP Service Group.13 We use waves from
the GSOEP that contain income information on an annual basis for the longest pos-
sible period 1991–2007, in order to include East Germany after reuniﬁcation. The
data sets contain relevant information from 17,921 individual observations in 6,665
survey households for 1991. For 2007, the sample increased to 25,366 individuals
and 11,072 households.
3.2 Income Concept
The decomposition of the change in measures of distribution from Equations (7),
(10), and (13) can be computed for any concept of income. We compute it for
equivalence-weighted pre ﬁsc incomes and are also are interested in post ﬁsc in-
comes. The progressive German tax-beneﬁt system induces an inequality-reducing
redistribution of incomes and by and large takes into account household structures
of tax-payers and recipients of beneﬁts respectively. Looking at pre- and post ﬁsc in-
comes allows us to assess to what extent the German tax beneﬁt system compensates
for changes in household size.
Data sets from the GSOEP contain appropriate income variables that are
deﬁned as follows (Grabka, 2007, p. 41 f.): A household’s pre ﬁsc income consists of
labor earnings, asset ﬂows, private retirement income and private transfers from all
household members.14 A household’s post ﬁsc income encompasses pre ﬁsc income,
public transfers, and social security pensions from all household members minus total
13 For a detailed overview of several data documentations see http://www.diw.de/en/diw_02.
c.299052.en/survey_methods.html.
14 Labor earnings include wages and salary from all employment including training, self-
employment income, and bonuses, overtime, and proﬁt-sharing. Asset ﬂows include income from
interest, dividends, and rent. Private transfers include payments from individuals outside of the
household including alimony and child support payments (Grabka, 2007, p. 41).
14tax-payments of all household members.15 Both concepts of income are deﬂated in
order to compute real incomes. Moreover, we add household imputed rental values.16
Computations are hence conducted as follows: individual incomes yi are equiv-
alent pre and post ﬁsc incomes respectively. That means household incomes are
divided by the sum of equivalence weights according to the OECD-modiﬁed equiva-
lence scale (OECD, 2005). For population weights wi we use the according weights
from the GSOEP (Grabka, 2007, pp. 181 ﬀ.). In the following analysis, we deﬁne
the poverty line z to be 60 per cent and the richness line ρ is deﬁned as 200 per cent
of the median of equivalent pre- and post government incomes respectively.
3.3 Deﬁnition of Population Subgroups
Like the deﬁnition of an income concept, a deﬁnition of how to divide population
into disjoint and exhaustive subgroups is of great importance for the following anal-
ysis. Since, according to our research question, household composition with respect
to number and age of household members is of relevance, the assignment of an in-
dividual to a group is based on this information: the ﬁrst criterion is the number
of adult household members, the second one is the number of children living in the
household. According to the deﬁnition of the modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale, we
deﬁne a person to be an adult at the age of 15 years or older. Analogously, a person
is deﬁned to be a child if its age does not exceed 14 years.17 We distinguish 14
population subgroups according to household composition (see Table 1). Tables 7
and 8 in the Appendix show in detail how diﬀerent types of households are captured
by our 14 subgroup in the years 1991 and 2007 respectively.
15 Public transfers include housing allowances, child beneﬁts, subsistence assistance, govern-
ment student assistance, maternity beneﬁts, unemployment beneﬁts, unemployment assistance,
and unemployment subsistence allowance. Social security pensions include payments from old age,
disability, and widowhood pension schemes. The tax burden includes income taxes and payroll
taxes: health, unemployment, retirement insurance and nursing home insurance taxes (Grabka,
2007, p. 42).
16 Taking into account an estimated income advantage for owner-occupiers is common in empir-
ical research (Eurostat, 2006; Grabka, 2007).
17 The choice of equivalence scale is not completely irrelevant, since inequality rankings in cross-
country comparison are sensitive to diﬀerent values of the equivalence-scale elasticity (Ebert and
Moyes, 2003; B¨ onke and Schr¨ oder, 2008). However, we ﬁnd that with respect to our research
question the choice of diﬀerent equivalence scales does not alter our results substantially (results
for diﬀerent scales are available upon request from the authors).
15Place Table 1 here.
Group 1 covers single-households and groups 2, 3, and 4 almost solely cover
individuals living in single-parent households. The vast majority of group 5 covers
childless couples and only a minority consists of single parents and their adult child.
Groups 6 to 10 are mainly covering couples with children. Groups 11 to 14 in
addition are covering households consisting of multiple generations.18
Table 1 shows that between 1991 and 2007 population shares increased consid-
erably only for two groups, namely singles (Group 1, +4.2 percentage points) and
couples without children (Group 5, +5.4 percentage points). Note that these two
groups do not only exhibit the strongest growth, but also make up for a large part
of the population. In 2007 more than half the population either belong to a single-
or a two-adult household without children.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Re-weighting
Since we are interested in the eﬀect of changing household structure on income dis-
tribution over time, we want to compare the actual change in values of distributional
measures to the change that would have occurred when household structure would
have remained unchanged between the base period of our analysis (the year 1991)
and the most recent period available (2007), everything else equal. To do so, one
has to assign counterfactual population weights to the sample population of 2007
in order to arrive at a marginal distribution of household structure identical to the
one in 1991.
As it is pointed out in subsection 2.2 this is done by re-deﬁning population
weights by multiplying the actual population weights with a re-weighting factor that
18 However, this form of cohabitation obviously is on the retreat in Germany: The proportion
of individuals living in multiple generation-households decreased from 2.4 to 1.3 per cent between
1991 and 2007 and hence can be seen as a marginal phenomenon. The only household types whose
proportions remarkably increased are one-person households (+4.2 percentage points) and couples
without children (+5.7 percentage points), while the proportion of couples with children decreased
(by 6.4 and 2.8 percentage points respectively) or remained nearly unchanged.
16is equal to the ratio of the population shares in the base and ﬁnal period. Formally,












i · ψx(x), (14)
where w2007
i denotes the actual population weight of individual i in 2007 and vk,i
denotes the population share of subgroup k to which individual i belongs. The
re-weighting function ψx(x) reduces to the fraction of population shares in case of
not controlling for further characteristics. Hence, if individual i belongs to a group
whose share increased between 1991 and 2007, the re-weighting factor is smaller
than one and its weight is downsized. It is enlarged if the re-weighting factor is
greater than one, i.e. the respective subgroup’s population share has decreased. This
way of re-weighting has been applied in the OECD report (OECD, 2008, p. 66) in
order to calculate counterfactual changes in income inequality assuming a constant
population structure with respect to household and age structure respectively.19
We apply this type of re-weighting for Germany and report calculations for
diﬀerent GE inequality measures (I0, I1, and I2) as well as for the Gini coeﬃcient
(IGini) and the measures for poverty and richness that were already introduced in
the previous sections. We compute how large the change in measures of distribution
would have been if the marginal distribution of household structure would not have
changed between 1991 and 2007. Table 2 reports several measures of inequality,
poverty, and richness and distinguished between pre and post ﬁsc incomes. We










19 The OECD deﬁnes six population subgroups with respect to household structure are de-
ﬁned by the age of the household head (working or retirement age), the number of adults in the
household (one or at least two), and the presence of children. In addition, the study refers to
the 20-year-period from 1985 to 2005 and only to the distribution of disposable incomes for West
Germany (OECD, 2008, p. 66).




Mact,07 − Mact,91 . (17)
This term denotes the share of the changing household structure in the total change
of the respective measure M.20 Note that it would equal zero if the re-weighted
counterfactual value in 2007 would resemble the actual one (Mact,07 = Mrew,07). In
this case, the changing household structure would not aﬀect the change at all. In the
other extreme case the term would equal 100 per cent if the re-weighted value of the
measure under consideration in 2007 would be equal to the actual value of the base
year 1991 (Mrew,07 = Mact,91). Then the household structure would be related to
the total change of the measure. The results are displayed in Table 2, which reveals
that the share of changing household structure varies between measures for poverty
(highest), inequality (medium), and richness (lowest) and between pre and post
ﬁsc incomes respectively. However, our results contradict the results of the OECD
(2008) who ﬁnd that 88.2 per cent of the actual change in the Gini coeﬃcient of
disposable income are due to changing household structure (p. 66), while we only
ﬁnd 12.8 per cent.21
Place Table 2 here.
For the re-weighting procedure, one can summarize that actual growth rates of
the measures of distribution – without exception – are larger than the counterfactual
re-weighted growth rates for pre ﬁsc as well as for post ﬁsc incomes. In other words,
the results of our re-weighting procedures state that inequality, poverty, and richness
would not have increased as much as they actually did if there would have been no
trend towards smaller households. The fact that the share of the eﬀect of household
structure is especially large for the GE inequality measure I2 (which is more sensitive
to the upper tail of the distribution) and for the poverty measures P2 (which is more
sensitive to the ”very poor”) indicates that changes in household structure might
20 Here, the character M is a placeholder for I (inequality), P (poverty), and R (richness)
respectively.
21In the meantime, the authors of the OECD study upon request conﬁrmed that the result of
88 per cent we refer to is not correct and a misprint.
18be more related to the tails of the respective income distributions.
In order to check the sensitivity of the results with respect to the method
chosen, we provide evidence from an alternative way of quantifying the eﬀect of
changing household structure on income distribution in the next subsection.
4.2 Decomposition Results
In this subsection we present the decomposition results for the diﬀerent measures,
income concepts, and – for inequality – regions.22 In the case of Germany it makes
sense to further diﬀerentiate between East and West Germany for the time after
reuniﬁcation in 1990.23
4.2.1 Inequality
The results for the decomposition of income inequality change according to Equation
(7) are displayed in Table 3. For pre ﬁsc incomes over-all inequality in reuniﬁed
Germany has increased by about 36.5 per cent between 1991 and 2007. About
15.7 percentage points of this change can be attributed to changes in household
structures (summands B and C). Consequently, one can note that more than 43
per cent of the increase in pre ﬁsc income inequality is related to the demographic
trend towards smaller household sizes.24 Noticeably, by attributing 15.5 percentage
22 Note that the decomposition results according to Equations (7), (10), and (13) are presented
as percentages and percentage points respectively. For example, ∆I0 and the summands A to D
are divided by It
0 and multiplied by 100 each. The fraction B+C
∆I0 is multiplied by 100. The same
holds analogously for the decompositions of poverty and richness.
23 This appears to be appropriate since it seems that there are still signiﬁcant income diﬀerentials
between the ”old” and ”new” states of the Federal Republic. The non-convergence of income
inequality is indirectly explained by much higher rates of unemployment in East Germany which
causes a high level of inequality in labor income, which is of greater importance relative to capital
income in East Germany (Frick and Goebel, 2008, p. 571).
24 Executing the decomposition alternatively by deﬁning population subgroups according to
family types (see Section 3.3 and Tables 7 and 8 in the Appendix) yields slightly diﬀerent results.
The proportions of summands B and C are even of greater magnitude. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd it
more appropriate to use population subgroups according to Table 1, since these are exactly based
on individual equivalence weights. Moreover, these results obviously are more conservative and
certainly do not overstate the eﬀect of changing household structure. The same holds similarly for
poverty and richness. However, the proportions vary in magnitude for diﬀerent time periods (see
Tables 9–11 in the Appendix). E.g., for inequality of pre-ﬁsc incomes vary between 28 and 35.8
per cent for diﬀerent alternative periods with base years 1991 or 1992 and ﬁnal years 2006 and
2007 respectively. For post-ﬁsc incomes the results vary between 13.8 and 16.2 per cent.
19points to over-all change, summand B makes up most of this proportion.25
Place Table 3 here.
In West Germany, pre ﬁsc income inequality has increased by 26.3 per cent
between 1991 and 2007, less than in the whole of Germany. The proportion of
summands B and C (43.4 per cent) is more or less identical. This suggests that the
rise in income inequality must have been much stronger in East Germany. Indeed, it
has nearly doubled since reuniﬁcation in 1991 (increase of 88.6 per cent). Shrinking
household sizes make up for 44.5 per cent of the over-all increase in Germany’s ”new
states”.
Our results for post ﬁsc income inequality decomposition show that the eﬀect
of changing household structures is signiﬁcantly lower than for pre ﬁsc income in-
equality. The proportion of summands B and C amounts to 14.9 per cent between
1991 and 2007. The German tax-beneﬁt system obviously takes into account house-
hold structure and compensates for most (not all) of inequality increases that can
be related to demographic changes. Altogether, post ﬁsc income inequality has in-
creased by 40.3 per cent. This increase is larger than the increase for pre ﬁsc income.
This result implies that the redistributive impact of the German tax-beneﬁt system
slightly declined over time.
Looking at West Germany separately reveals that the proportion of summands
B and C between 1991 and 2007 (25.2 per cent) is higher than for the whole of
Germany. In East Germany, income inequality has grown by 46 per cent between
1991 and 2007. Summands B and C account for about ten per cent.26
Table 4 displays the contributions of each single population subgroup to the
components of inequality change for pre- and post ﬁsc incomes respectively.27 It
25 Summand B from equation (7) describes the eﬀect of the change in population structure
on within-group inequality. Obviously, population subgroups that are characterized by smaller
household size exhibit greater within-group inequality than others. Thus, the increase in relative
size of these groups has signiﬁcantly contributed to the over-all increase in income inequality.
26 Note that the results for B+C
∆I0 for Germany are not be interpreted as a weighted average of
the results for West and East. That is why it is possible to ﬁnd a higher value for Germany while
ﬁnding lower values for West and East both.
27 Note that according to Equation (7) it holds that Ak = ¯ vk · ∆I0k, Bk = ¯ I0k · ∆vk, Ck = h
¯ λk − ln(λk)
i
· ∆vk, and Dk =
 ¯ θk − ¯ vk

· ∆ln(¯ yk).
20becomes apparent that the results presented in Table 3 were mainly driven by cer-
tain subgroups, but not in a uniform way. Not surprisingly, especially groups 1
and 5 (single- and two-adult-households) positively contributed to overall inequality
change. Another group with a smaller but still noticeable positive contribution is
group 3 (one adult with two children not older than 14).
Place Table 4 here.
Contributions with a counteracting negative sign – i.e. a decrease in group-
speciﬁc inequality – are groups that represent certain multi-person-households with
children (Groups 6–10). For pre ﬁsc incomes these groups remarkably reduce the
proportion of summands B and C. The net-eﬀect of 43 per cent, however, is still
noteworthy. For post ﬁsc incomes, the opposing eﬀects we described at the beginning
become even more evident. The positive and negative contributions of the groups
that appear to be the ”main drivers” of the over-all eﬀect are quite substantial in
both directions. However, the bottom line is the fact that the opposing gross-eﬀects
per group nearly outweigh each other, such that the over-all proportion of summands
B and C (only) adds up to a mere 14.9 per cent.
4.2.2 Poverty
The results for the decomposition of poverty according to Equation (10) change are
presented in Table 5. For pre ﬁsc incomes, poverty measures increased by 21.3 to
24.7 per cent between 1991 and 2007, depending on the value for α. Note that for
α = 0 the FGT poverty measure equals the head count ratio (HC). More than half
of the change in total pre ﬁsc poverty can be attributed to demographic changes
(varying between 52.4 and 73.1 per cent for diﬀerent values of α). Hence, for α = 2
the proportion of summand B is nearly three quarters.
Place Table 5 here.
For post ﬁsc incomes, the demographic eﬀect on poverty change sums to almost
one quarter of total change. Just as in the case of pre ﬁsc incomes, the highest value
is reported for α = 2, which is a measure that emphasizes severe poverty. It should
21be noted that, similar to the observation for inequality, relative poverty growth was
greater for post ﬁsc incomes, although its level is lower than for pre ﬁsc incomes.
This means, governmental re-distribution of incomes became less eﬀective during
this period.
4.2.3 Richness
The results for the decomposition of the change in richness (see Equation (13)) are
presented in Table 6. The richness measures for pre ﬁsc incomes increased quite
considerably between 1991 and 2007 by more than 81 per cent for β = 1 and by two
thirds for β = 3. The head count ratio for richness (HC) increased by more than
41 per cent. Note that the richness measure Rβ resembles the head count ratio for
β → ∞. The fraction of over-all pre ﬁsc richness change that can be attributed to
demographic changes amounts to quite considerable values between 42.3 and 52.2
per cent for diﬀerent values of β respectively.
Place Table 6 here.
The overall growth rates of richness for post ﬁsc incomes do not diﬀer very
much from those reported for pre ﬁsc incomes (between 46.6 and 76.1 per cent).
However, the proportions of summand B are much lower for incomes after tax and
transfer payments. They vary between 8.0 and 9.4 per cent depending on the value
for β. For richness, the diﬀerence between the shares of summands B and C for pre
(beyond 40 per cent) and post ﬁsc incomes (below 10 per cent) respectively is con-
siderably large in comparison to the beforehand reported diﬀerences for inequality
and poverty.
4.3 Potential ﬁscal costs
In addition we are interested in the potentially implicated ﬁscal costs the German
state would be confronted with if the government would aim at undoing the increase
in inequality that is associated with the change in household structure.
More precisely, we we want to know which amount of lump sum transfer pay-
22ment28 would be necessary in order to reduce the level of post ﬁsc income inequality
in 2007 for the actually observed distribution of household structure to the level
that would have been reached in case of a counterfactual distribution of household
structure identical to the one in 1991.
Thus, we iteratively increased post ﬁsc equivalence-weighted income for every
individual in the sample population (of 2007) by the same lump sum amount until
the level of inequality, measured by I0 as a benchmark, equalled the level attained
when computed with counterfactual population weights (as described above).
The result is that it would require the state to distribute a lump sum transfer
of about 263.0 equivalent money units to every individual in order to reduce the
inequality measure I0 accordingly, i.e. undoing the diﬀerence between actual and re-
weighted growth. Taking into account diﬀerent household sizes – and hence diﬀerent
equivalence weights – for every individual ﬁscal costs sum up to about 15.5 billion
Euros. This is equivalent to 5.8 per cent of the federal government budget or 0.65
per cent of German GDP in 2007.29
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to quantify the eﬀect of continuously decreasing aver-
age household size on measures of income distribution in Germany. By means of a
re-weighting procedure and decompositions of changes in measures of income dis-
tribution (inequality, poverty, and richness) and based on income data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel, we computed to what extent the over-all changes
in income distribution result from changes in population structure with respect to
household composition.
Irrespective of the choice of methodology, it appears that the changing struc-
28 Lump sum payment is the most eﬃcient way to redistribute incomes from an optimal tax
point of view. Moreover, this procedure reduces inequality since lower incomes gain more in
relative terms. Hence, this makes the distribution more equal.
29 The sums are expressed in prices of 2006 according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) pub-
lished by the Federal Statistical Oﬃce. Deﬂated by the CPI Germany’s GDP amounted 2,390.0
billion Euros (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009) and the federal budget 266.1 billion Euros (Bun-
desministerium der Finanzen, 2009).
23ture of German population with respect to household composition during the period
between 1991 and 2007 is associated with increasing values for all indices of inequal-
ity, poverty, and richness under consideration.30 Without the demographic trend
towards smaller households inequality, poverty, and richness would also have in-
creased. But the levels would be lower than they actually are. However, our result
that household structure accounts for about 15 per cent of the change in (post ﬁsc)
income inequality, which is much lower than it was reported by the OECD, suggests
that there are other important driving forces underlying the growing income gap.
Among else, these could be changes in the distribution of human capital or decreas-
ing bargaining power of trade unions. Investigating these factors is left to future
research.
It turns out that the re-weighting approach and the decomposition reveal sim-
ilar results for inequality, while the results for poverty and richness partly diﬀer
substantially. Hence, when looking at the whole income distribution the choice of
methodology does not matter, while it does so at the tails of the distribution. In
addition, we state that the eﬀect of demographic change on income distribution is
lower for post ﬁsc than for pre ﬁsc incomes, since we ﬁnd much greater proportions
of the demographic eﬀect in cases of the latter. This means, the tax beneﬁt system
in Germany provides – at least implicitly – some form of compensation for changing
household structure.31
Note that there are limitations to both approaches we apply here. First, they
remain descriptive, i.e. based on these results one cannot state that there is a causal
relationship between household structure and income inequality. Second, the de-
composition approach that we employed is focused on distinct indices rather than
taking into account the whole distribution. But it can be seen as a ”ﬁrst step” in
explaining distributional changes (Bourguignon and Ferreira, 2005, p. 18).
30 Note that increasing poverty and richness is implicitly equivalent to increasing polarization of
the income distribution, since measures for polarization can be deﬁned as weighted sums of poverty
and richness for a given distribution (Scheicher, 2008).
31 However, one could also argue that the fact that the German tax-beneﬁt system compensated
for most demographic change based increase in inequality, poverty, and richness itself has an eﬀect
on the demographic trend. So, as far as one can think of a causal relationship anyway, this could
be reverse. For instance, the reform measures concerning German labor market policy in 2005
(the so-called ”Hartz” reforms) generated incentives for young unemployed adults to leave their
parents’ house earlier in order to receive a certain social beneﬁt (or at least a higher amount).
24In summary, we conclude that statements on income distribution must be
diﬀerentiated. If public policy aims at reducing the income gap, measures taken
should depend on its causes. Hence, it is important to disentangle potential drivers
of a growing income gap.
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27A Appendix
A.1 Tables
Table 1: Population subgroups: deﬁnition, numbers, population shares, and mean incomes
1991–2007
k adults children number 1991 ∆ number vk,1991 ∆vk ¯ yk,1991 ∆¯ yk
1 1 0 12.64 3.73 15.76 4.23 17,329.85 1,351.29
2 1 1 1.19 0.01 1.49 -0.02 11,446.88 668.90
3 1 2 0.32 0.43 0.41 0.52 11,722.34 1.69
4 1 ≥3 0.23 0.01 0.29 0.01 14,215.58 -3,852.96
5 2 0 20.92 4.86 26.09 5.39 20,852.58 2,463.13
6 2 1 8.11 -1.05 10.11 -1.49 18,626.29 2,382.14
7 2 2 9.35 -1.90 11.66 -2.56 17,262.37 2,649.78
8 2 ≥3 4.03 -1.58 5.03 -2.04 15,114.36 4,163.70
9 3 0 9.25 -1.58 11.54 -2.17 21,062.84 197.27
10 ≥3 1 5.54 -0.73 6.91 -1.03 18,537.21 -276.01
11 ≥3 2 1.66 0.00 2.07 -0.04 15,011.32 690.35
12 ≥3 ≥3 0.84 -0.44 1.05 -0.56 15,014.65 -1,334.53
13 4 0 4.88 0.04 6.08 -0.08 20,613.69 1,134.02
14 ≥5 0 1.21 -0.11 1.51 -0.16 19,466.01 -1,510.14
Total – – 80.17 1.70 100.00 0.00 18,815.36 1,775.49
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Number of individuals in million. The population share of group k is denoted with
vk (in per cent). The symbol ∆ denotes the diﬀerence-operator. Hence, ∆vk and ∆¯ yk denote the change of population shares
and group mean income between 1991 and 2007 respectively. Group mean incomes (¯ yk) are annual equivalence weighted
post ﬁsc incomes (Euro, in prices of 2006).
28Table 2: Actual and re-weighted changes of inequality, poverty, and
richness measures 1991–2007
pre ﬁsc post ﬁsc
measure ∆act ∆rew ∆act−∆rew
∆act ∆act ∆rew ∆act−∆rew
∆act
IGini 18.39 13.03 29.17 16.14 14.08 12.76
I0 36.46 22.09 39.42 40.27 34.25 14.96
I1 42.13 29.54 29.88 54.51 47.49 12.87
I2 107.12 81.76 23.67 187.16 159.75 14.65
PHC 21.32 13.38 37.26 22.60 18.74 17.09
P1 24.69 13.28 46.22 36.35 27.97 23.06
P2 22.66 10.34 54.39 47.24 34.68 26.59
R1 81.11 59.03 27.23 76.06 69.78 8.26
R3 66.12 46.45 29.76 65.75 60.17 8.48
RHC 41.14 25.58 37.82 46.62 41.81 10.33
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Note that the results for actual (∆act) and
re-weighted changes (∆rew) as well as the term ∆act−∆rew
∆act are displayed as percentages,
i.e. they were multiplied by 100.
Table 3: Inequality decomposition 1991–2007
income region I1991
0 I2007
0 ∆I0 A B C D B+C
∆I0
pre ﬁsc Germany 0.69 0.94 36.46 20.60 15.45 0.24 0.15 43.03
West 0.68 0.86 26.29 14.97 11.28 0.12 -0.09 43.37
East 0.66 1.24 88.62 49.05 38.11 1.36 0.18 44.54
post ﬁsc Germany 0.11 0.15 40.27 33.22 5.63 0.38 0.82 14.94
West 0.11 0.15 46.02 40.30 4.48 0.22 0.83 10.22
East 0.07 0.10 38.80 33.85 6.52 3.27 -4.98 25.24
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Results for ∆I0 and B+C
∆I0 are displayed as percentages. Results
for A–D are displayed as percentage points. See Footnote 22.
29Table 4: Inequality decomposition 1991–2007: results per group
income k adults children Ak Bk Ck Dk
Bk+Ck
∆I0
pre ﬁsc 1 1 0 -5.84 11.35 6.38 -0.98 48.63
2 1 1 1.64 -0.04 -0.04 0.21 -0.23
3 1 2 0.53 0.45 0.95 0.33 3.84
4 1 ≥3 -1.38 0.06 0.03 0.24 0.23
5 2 0 9.55 7.96 7.81 0.05 43.25
6 2 1 4.08 -0.77 -2.19 0.29 -8.13
7 2 2 3.19 -0.91 -3.73 0.12 -12.71
8 2 ≥3 1.52 -0.89 -2.98 -0.16 -10.61
9 3 0 3.16 -1.03 -3.19 -0.06 -11.58
10 ≥3 1 0.88 -0.27 -1.50 -0.04 -4.87
11 ≥3 2 1.55 -0.02 -0.06 0.05 -0.22
12 ≥3 ≥3 0.49 -0.34 -0.88 0.09 -3.32
13 4 0 0.37 -0.02 -0.12 0.03 -0.39
14 ≥5 0 0.86 -0.07 -0.24 -0.01 -0.85
Total – – 20.60 15.45 0.24 0.15 43.03
post ﬁsc 1 1 0 5.98 6.86 40.36 -1.10 117.24
2 1 1 -0.00 -0.02 -0.24 -0.32 -0.66
3 1 2 -0.70 0.49 5.51 -0.00 14.88
4 1 ≥3 -0.84 0.02 0.12 0.33 0.34
5 2 0 10.99 7.04 51.52 3.71 145.40
6 2 1 5.23 -1.47 -14.16 0.04 -38.83
7 2 2 2.07 -2.02 -24.39 -0.86 -65.57
8 2 ≥3 2.14 -1.85 -19.58 -1.36 -53.22
9 3 0 4.28 -1.98 -20.63 0.07 -56.15
10 ≥3 1 0.58 -0.78 -9.85 0.05 -26.41
11 ≥3 2 0.79 -0.03 -0.39 -0.19 -1.04
12 ≥3 ≥3 0.02 -0.42 -5.53 0.17 -14.79
13 4 0 2.09 -0.07 -0.79 0.23 -2.12
14 ≥5 0 0.56 -0.12 -1.54 0.05 -4.14
Total – – 33.22 5.63 0.38 0.82 14.94
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Results for
Bk+Ck
∆I0 are displayed as percentages. Results
for Ak–Dk are displayed as percentage points. See Footnote 22.
30Table 5: Poverty decomposition 1991–2007
income α P 1991
α P 2007
α ∆Pα A B B/∆Pα
pre ﬁsc HC 0.29 0.35 21.32 10.14 11.18 52.43
1 0.18 0.23 24.69 9.39 15.31 61.98
2 0.15 0.18 22.66 6.09 16.57 73.14
post ﬁsc HC 0.12 0.14 22.60 16.97 5.63 24.93
1 0.02 0.03 36.35 27.06 9.30 25.58
2 0.01 0.01 47.24 34.73 12.51 26.48
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Results for ∆Pα and B/∆Pα are dis-
played as percentages. Results for A and B are displayed as percentage points. See
Footnote 22.
Table 6: Richness decomposition 1991–2007
income β R1991
β R2007
β ∆Rβ A B B/∆Rβ
pre ﬁsc 1 0.03 0.05 81.11 50.25 42.34 52.20
3 0.06 0.09 66.12 50.24 31.96 48.34
HC 0.12 0.18 41.14 29.62 17.42 42.34
post ﬁsc 1 0.01 0.02 76.06 57.37 6.06 7.96
3 0.02 0.04 65.75 50.97 5.37 8.17
HC 0.06 0.08 46.62 34.91 4.39 9.43
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Results for ∆Rβ and B/∆Rβ are dis-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Table 9: Inequality decomposition 1991–2006
income region I1991
0 I2006
0 ∆I0 A B C D B+C
∆I0
pre ﬁsc Germany 0.69 0.97 41.06 27.36 13.25 0.25 0.18 32.90
West 0.68 0.88 29.35 19.96 9.11 0.20 0.09 31.71
East 0.66 1.31 99.55 64.06 34.73 1.03 -0.28 35.92
post ﬁsc Germany 0.11 0.14 36.27 30.79 4.54 0.46 0.30 13.76
West 0.11 0.15 41.73 36.98 3.45 0.48 0.65 9.43
East 0.07 0.10 36.99 37.33 5.57 2.41 -7.93 21.57
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Results for ∆I0 and B+C
∆I0 are displayed as percentages. Results
for A–D are displayed as percentage points. See Footnote 22.
Table 10: Inequality decomposition 1992–2006
income region I1992
0 I2006
0 ∆I0 A B C D B+C
∆I0
pre ﬁsc Germany 0.68 0.97 43.77 31.46 11.90 0.34 0.06 27.97
West 0.65 0.88 35.06 26.65 8.08 0.33 -0.01 23.99
East 0.71 1.31 85.34 53.97 31.85 1.18 -1.46 38.71
post ﬁsc Germany 0.11 0.14 29.23 24.68 3.83 0.69 -0.08 15.46
West 0.11 0.15 31.33 27.71 2.63 0.78 0.10 10.88
East 0.07 0.10 35.04 33.23 5.97 2.18 -6.02 23.26
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Results for ∆I0 and B+C
∆I0 are displayed as percentages. Results
for A–D are displayed as percentage points. See Footnote 22.
Table 11: Inequality decomposition 1992–2007
income region I1992
0 I2007
0 ∆I0 A B C D B+C
∆I0
pre ﬁsc Germany 0.68 0.94 39.09 25.01 13.68 0.30 0.07 35.77
West 0.65 0.86 31.86 22.12 9.66 0.19 -0.13 30.92
East 0.71 1.24 75.18 39.83 35.18 1.43 -1.02 48.69
post ﬁsc Germany 0.11 0.15 33.03 27.06 4.79 0.56 0.48 16.21
West 0.11 0.15 35.30 30.84 3.53 0.43 0.37 11.20
East 0.07 0.10 36.82 29.95 6.76 2.60 -2.66 25.41
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Results for ∆I0 and B+C
∆I0 are displayed as percentages. Results
for A–D are displayed as percentage points. See Footnote 22.
34Table 12: Poverty decomposition 1991–2006
income α P 1991
α P 2006
α ∆Pα A B B/∆Pα
pre ﬁsc HC 0.29 0.35 23.88 13.44 10.45 43.74
1 0.18 0.24 30.03 16.24 13.79 45.92
2 0.15 0.19 29.30 14.57 14.73 50.27
post ﬁsc HC 0.12 0.14 17.85 11.95 5.90 33.07
1 0.02 0.03 38.28 30.46 7.81 20.41
2 0.01 0.01 51.80 41.42 10.38 20.04
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Results for ∆Pα and B/∆Pα are dis-
played as percentages. Results for A and B are displayed as percentage points. See
Footnote 22.
Table 13: Poverty decomposition 1992–2006
income α P 1992
α P 2006
α ∆Pα A B B/∆Pα
pre ﬁsc HC 0.30 0.35 18.63 9.29 9.34 50.13
1 0.19 0.24 25.73 13.37 12.35 48.02
2 0.15 0.19 26.11 12.90 13.21 50.58
post ﬁsc HC 0.12 0.14 13.80 9.39 4.42 32.01
1 0.03 0.03 31.79 24.67 7.11 22.37
2 0.01 0.01 34.22 24.62 9.60 28.06
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Results for ∆Pα and B/∆Pα are dis-
played as percentages. Results for A and B are displayed as percentage points. See
Footnote 22.
Table 14: Poverty decomposition 1992–2007
income α P 1992
α P 2007
α ∆Pα A B B/∆Pα
pre ﬁsc HC 0.30 0.35 16.18 6.16 10.02 61.93
1 0.19 0.23 20.57 6.93 13.64 66.33
2 0.15 0.18 19.63 4.85 14.78 75.28
post ﬁsc HC 0.12 0.14 18.39 14.17 4.22 22.97
1 0.03 0.03 29.95 21.83 8.12 27.11
2 0.01 0.01 30.19 19.19 11.00 36.45
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Results for ∆Pα and B/∆Pα are dis-
played as percentages. Results for A and B are displayed as percentage points. See
Footnote 22.
35Table 15: Richness decomposition 1991–2006
income β R1991
β R2006
β ∆Rβ A B B/∆Rβ
pre ﬁsc 1 0.03 0.05 82.31 65.80 39.20 47.63
3 0.06 0.09 68.06 61.68 29.70 43.64
HC 0.12 0.18 40.49 34.01 16.32 40.31
post ﬁsc 1 0.01 0.02 73.39 51.72 4.04 5.51
3 0.02 0.04 63.71 44.04 3.71 5.82
HC 0.06 0.08 43.61 29.76 3.60 8.26
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Results for ∆Rβ and B/∆Rβ are dis-
played as percentages. Results for A and B are displayed as percentage points. See
Footnote 22.
Table 16: Richness decomposition 1992–2006
income β R1992
β R2006
β ∆Rβ A B B/∆Rβ
pre ﬁsc 1 0.03 0.05 69.75 48.91 33.16 47.54
3 0.06 0.09 58.95 49.94 25.74 43.67
HC 0.13 0.18 39.93 31.10 15.51 38.85
post ﬁsc 1 0.01 0.02 57.71 34.27 3.05 5.28
3 0.03 0.04 50.70 28.52 3.14 6.19
HC 0.06 0.08 30.47 20.28 3.02 9.93
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Results for ∆Rβ and B/∆Rβ are dis-
played as percentages. Results for A and B are displayed as percentage points. See
Footnote 22.
Table 17: Richness decomposition 1992–2007
income β R1992
β R2007
β ∆Rβ A B B/∆Rβ
pre ﬁsc 1 0.03 0.05 68.64 34.08 36.43 53.08
3 0.06 0.09 57.11 38.90 28.10 49.20
HC 0.13 0.18 40.58 26.49 16.84 41.51
post ﬁsc 1 0.01 0.02 60.13 39.22 5.06 8.41
3 0.03 0.04 52.58 34.74 4.82 9.16
HC 0.06 0.08 33.21 24.93 3.77 11.34
Note: Own calculations based on GSOEP. Results for ∆Rβ and B/∆Rβ are dis-
played as percentages. Results for A and B are displayed as percentage points. See
Footnote 22.

























































































































¯ vk · ∆Pα,k +
K X
k=1
¯ Pα,k · ∆vk (18h)
37